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lished in the absence of those images to which he implicitly or explicitly referred; the visual citations have been excluded. This is true of the earlier and later editions of his texts, as well as of his books and journal writings. Even the texts Benjamin published dur ing his lifetime, including those that explicitly grew out of visual materials or were directly related to them, usually appeared with out the accompaniment of images. Such a practice, I believe, is tantamount to publishing a piece of literary criticism that lacks direct quotations from the analyzed text. And in most cases, inter preters are not even aware of the fact that the text in front of them is actually incomplete.
What I would like do in this essay is to demonstrate what a reading of Benjamin that does take the visual dimension of his texts into account might look like. I will do this primarily in the context of his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduci bility."2 My claim is that the aura of the work of art, the loss of which Benjamin apparently laments in this text, was actually a pro duced authorial effect. Once we understand this, we can in fact what is usually considered to be the enigmatic quality of his texts, I will reconsider some of the oppositions contained in his essays. I will therefore read "Critique of Violence" against the grain and deconstruct the opposition between the myth of Niobe and the Biblical story of Korah that Benjamin proposes there.
Against One Tradition
In his "Short History of Photography5" and "The Author as Producer"6 Benjamin points to the separation between text and image as a clear mechanism of control that should be resisted and overcome.
Benjamin never constructed the visual as a separate realm, but weaved it into the textual in a way that obliges his read ers (spectators) to look for the visual, to look at the visual, and then to go back and forth between the visual and the textual. We can start with one example. In the supplement for the XVII thesis of his essay on history, Benjamin examines the locomotive, about which Marx had also written. For Marx the locomotive was a concept, a thought, through which he imagined a revolution that would plow through world history. Benjamin, on the other hand, observed the locomotive, and his gaze encountered something else: "Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of world history. But perhaps it is otherwise quiet. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the pas sengers on this train, the human race ? to activate the emergency brake."7 In his thinking, Marx rushes past concrete material reality to the general noun "locomotive," and from there he moves to abstract concepts such as "revolution" and "historical process."8
Benjamin makes his way to history as well, but not before pausing to ponder the minute details of the actual experience. It is neither the general noun (a train, or a handle) nor the concept (the revolu tion, world history) but rather the materiality of a concrete object, the emergency handle, which mediates for him concrete experi ence and speculative thought. In the framework of this text on his tory, which is an ontological-epistemological analysis of catastro phe, his gaze falls upon on an emergency handle, and what he sees in that handle is a potential to make "the continuum of history explode" (" /' 395). Concrete objects or images, therefore, are left as traces in Benjamin's writings (additional examples from "Theses on the Philosophy of History" include the automaton chess player or the grain of rice on which a whole chapter of the Psalm is written). It has subsequently become almost impossible to reconstruct in an accu rate, comprehensive, and systematic manner all those visual pas sages that were cut from his writings. One day an editor might decide to publish a new and improved edition of Benjamin's com plete writings, which would include postcards, pictures, newspaper cutouts, sketches, and the additional documentation of objects and places. Such an edition, I believe, would provide the proper condi tions for the transmission of Benjamin's texts. In the meantime, it rests upon contemporary readers to follow the textual traces of this lost visual archive and to pay close attention to the pictures that have ultimately left their marks there; they must be made integral to the practice of reading Benjamin. After all, these pictures speak ?
though not verbally ? from within the texts, and they are numerous.
However to discuss images is not necessarily to talk about art.
Art in general as well as works of art in particular play only a minor role in Benjamin's writings. Even the title of his essay ? "The Work of Art in the Age of Reproducibility" ? is misleading, as it gives the impression that the "work of art" is a stable category with a self-evi dent meaning, and that works of art existed, as such at least before the modern era. Benjamin invokes many different kinds of objects, each of which has a strong visual presence, and he explores the visuality that these objects carry with them. Examples include coins, religious relics, altars, stamps, and caricatures. His discus sion of these objects and images "extends far beyond the realm of art" ("WA," 104). Throughout the essay, Benjamin defines the work of art through negation. He points to a certain lack in modern artis tic production, a lack that generated out of technical reproduction:
In even the most perfect reproduction, one thing is lacking, the here and now of the work of art ? its unique existence in a par ticular place" ("WA," 103). The real work of art, what remains unblemished and lacks nothing, the complete work, has a singular "here and now" that the new work of art lacks. Benjamin identifies the "here and now" as the authenticity of the work, and loss of the "here and now" signifies the work's loss of authenticity. Benjamin's essay has been the subject of many interpretations, which, despite their differences share a basic assumption: that before the age of mechanical reproduction, works of art were "embedded in tradi tion" and enjoyed a certain, singular, and irreproducible status as hallowed objects, and that this special aura was lost with the advance of modern technology ("WA," 105). Benjamin, so it seems, appears to mourn the loss of that aura ? a loss that is brought about through the emergence of a new type of mechanical reproduction of the work of art. It is at first easy to reconstruct a series of oppositions that the essay seems to imply and employ in its own argument: ritual ver sus exhibition as two contexts for the presentation of works of art; it possible for an image or an object to appear outside the special place designated for its presence.
In this sense, if
Benjamin's essay is a eulogy at all, it is, I believe, a eulogy not for the aura of the work of art, but rather to something else ? to the loss of the designated place. The loss of place means a transition from a unique place, where one must be present in order to expe rience the object, to a place in which both the object and the place itself can be experienced without necessarily being there.14 Benjamin expresses this vividly through a remark by Paul Val?ry, which he added to the last version of the "Work of Art" essay in 1939: "Just as water, gas, and electricity are brought into our hous es from far off to satisfy our needs in response to a minimal effort, so we shall be supplied with visual or auditory images, which will appear and disappear at a simple movement of the hand, hardly more than a sign" ("WA," 253).
The loss of a unique place affects the conditions for exercis ing authority and authority's mode of appearance. Benjamin recognized that both politics and art responded to this loss in a similar way: a specific form of compensation for the loss that implied and produced a denial of the loss. This was precisely the role of the new art museum and art gallery that mushroomed throughout Europe and other Western countries: those clean, neu tral spaces in which objects appeared as irreproducible, one-time ly and unique in special or retrospective exhibitions.15 In effect, the establishment of those shrines resulted in the predominance of a certain mode of artistic activity: specifically, the production of orig inal objects that would justify the existence of privileged ones endowed with a special authority of their own. This mode of artis tic activity/production also justifies the claim of the museum to pro vide a special place to these objects, to give them a hallowed pres ence. Something similar could be said regarding the realm of poli tics, but it would take me too long to say it here completely. suggested by Benjamin's texts is the reconstruction ofthat other tra dition of the transmission of reproducibility, the main practice of which is destruction directed first of all at the mechanism that endows objects with authority and the locality of sacredness.
Thus contrary to the first tradition, which is centralized and closed, the second is decentralized and open. The first centers on supposedly original objects and authentic relics, expropriating them from the economy of exchange; the other exchanges the object's presence for its image, which is replaceable in principle.
The first removes the image or the object from any of its discursive milieus and insists on separating image from text. The second seeks to inscribe its images into narratives, to revive the art of story-telling as a form for the transmission of images, and to refuse any attempt to restore an original image from the stories that are piled one on top of the other, continually changing as they are chained like beads in the string of tradition.
The Revolutionary Strike "What exists he reduces to rubble ? not for the sake of the rubble, but for that of the way leading through it" ("DC," 542).
The destructive character, Benjamin continues, cannot be alone: "Just as the creator seeks solitude, the destroyer must be constantly surrounded by people" ("DC," 542). Contrary to the cre ator, who seeks to "pass things down to posterity, by making them untouchable and thus preserving them," the destructive character
"passfes] on situations, by making them practicable and thus liqui dating them" ("DC," 542). Photography can illustrate both scenar ios. People from the first tradition might try to make a photograph untouchable from the moment it depicts the irreproducible, there by adopting the photograph into the tradition of the unique. The destructive character will do everything to destroy the petrified image together with the sacred moment it allegedly depicts and to pass the image on to others as "practicable," something to be used and changed in and through its transmission.
The Photographic Image Cannot Be Appropriate(d)
The photograph as an object, a piece of material, can change hands and be preserved by the first tradition. But no tradition can appropriate the photographed image.18 The photographic image can only be transmitted. In the Arcades Project, Benjamin refers to the camera as a producer of pictures, with each shot producing another unique picture.19 This is not the technical picture that por trays a man's mere use of a machine, but an image that results from their encounter, or in Benjamin's own words: "What makes the first photographs uniquely one of their kind is perhaps this: they are the first image from the encounter between man and machine" (PS, 692). It is not this first "encounter between man and machine" that is important, but the fact that these are the first images to have been produced by such an encounter. This image presents the encounter neither from the perspective of the photographer nor from that of the photographed person; it is an image obtained from the encounter itself. Since the encounter usually bring together not only a person and a machine, but also the photographer and the photographed person, and these two are then joined by a third, the spectator, we may conclude by saying that the image of the encounter can never be fully appropriated by any of the partners; it always lies between and is shared among them.
In his "Work of Art" essay, Benjamin discusses the work of was writing these lines. But Benj?min does discuss these photos as evidence produced for a trial. If we indeed seek to find some record for the trial that Benjamin perceived, we might not limit our selves to the main corpus of Atget's photographs which might illus trate only metaphorically the notion of a crime scene, and look instead to the periphery of the body of images.
Among the thousands of photographs of the city, there are a few frames in which some actual figures appear. These evidentiary photographs candidly show city dwellers ? prostitutes, tramps, and vagabonds ? who were banned from the city streets, and whose banishment could be understood as what had turned the city streets into the scene of a crime. In two photos dating from the beginning of the 1920s, we can see several filles publiques ("pub lic girls"); the women are not shown in the street itself but periph erally, at the doors of houses. Their bodies, on which new urban regulations were being written, were removed from the city's pub lic spaces, but they could not be hidden completely behind the building walls. In the photographs, the women are standing on the doorstep of the house to which they belong. Is it their home? A
brothel? Yet they also extend, almost slide, a bit from out the front door. One woman is standing on the doorstep leaning forward somewhat, while the other is sitting on a chair at the entrance to the house, and her elbow is slightly inserted back through the open door (or so it seems, given the angle of view Atget has chosen) per haps in order to leave an opening for negotiation with the police man or the supervisor who will come to arrest her for showing her self in public.
Of course let us not forget that Benjamin was a consummate draftsman and consistently reiterated fragments of his ideas, but always with slight variations in each version. I have chosen to read these photographs by Atget with the help of a passage from the Arcades. It is a fragment that Benjamin copied from Paris' newly written regulations on prostitution (PS, 517). According to these regulations, prostitutes should have been removed from the streets of Paris and shoved behind locked doors, thus cleansing the public domain of their provocative presence. These regulations imposed constraints and restrictions governing freedom of movement and speech on these public girls. Policemen were given the authority to expel from city streets women who walked alone in public, to stamp them with the shaming sign "whore" and to ban them from the public space. read the text as a member of the first tradition, the tradition of the irreproducible and untouchable. So I would like to conclude this paper by proposing a new reading of his last paragraphs in "Critique of Violence," one that would be attentive to the visual in the scene of horror and that would make use of the distinction between the two traditions I have reconstructed from his later "Work of Art" essay.
Of course, no photographs were taken when Niobe was turned into a stone and Korah swallowed by the earth, but across the years some pictures were drawn, and Benjamin might have had those in mind. Yet, I have no evidence for this. In this case, I must rely on the text alone, in which no image is mentioned; but we do find, very clearly, the presence of spectators. Therefore, although we lack images, we have at least some scenes to watch. These spectators are watching very particular images ? images of horror.
The first image is of Niobe, the second is of the people who watch
Korah's disappearance. The text presents these two stories as illus trations for the opposition between mythic violence and divine vio lence. The reader is compelled to reconstruct the opposition between these two types of violence by superimposing the opposi tion on another one ? that between the stories of Niobe and Korah. Although many interpretations attempt to assert the exis tence of these oppositions, in reconstructing them, we see that they actually bear more similarities than they do differences.
A few examples of these similarities will probably suffice.
Regarding the biblical story of Korah, divine violence strikes imme diately "without warning and without threat" ("CV," 250). At the same time, divine violence is not only inflicted as an abrupt blast, but it is part of a structured ordeal, and at a certain point is even negotiated between Moses and God. In the myth, Niobe also loses most of her family practically at once. And if some of her fourteen offspring were spared death, as indicated by some versions of the myth, it was also due to negotiation. Korah leaves behind him a band of people in varying degrees of association and kinship who, like Niobe, witness the act of violence and lament the loss, and, like Niobe, they may also be bound by guilt. Niobe, the heroine of "her" story did not really stay alive, as we learn that she too disap peared into the earth or merged with it by becoming a stone. cases. For only mythic violence, not divine, will be recognizable as such with certainty unless it be in incomparable effects, because the expiatory power of violence is invisible to men" ("CV," 252).
Regarding expiatory power, we learn while reading the bibli cal story that expiation was not the result of divine violence but of a certain ritual performed by Aaron, the high priest. The day after the earth swallowed Korah and his company, the people rebelled again in protest against the death of Korah and his people. God begins to strike them, by inflicting them with a plague, but Aaron, upon Moses' instruction, places cense in the censer in order to achieve the expiation of those rebels: "And Moses said unto Aaron, take a censer, and put fire there in from off the altar, and put incense, and take it quickly unto the congregation, and make an atonement for them, for there wrath gone out from the Lord; the plague is begun" (Num 16:46). Thus, expiatory power was given to Moses and Aaron as a means of stopping not only divine violence but of stopping revolutionary power as well. This expiatory power stayed invisible to men, specifically to those men who rebelled against the death sentence inflicted upon Korah and his company.
Maybe
it is not so much that they could not see it, but that they refused to recognize it for what it was ? expiatory power. It is important for Benjamin to distinguish between the use of unalloyed violence and the determinate affirmation that unalloyed violence was indeed in use in a particular case. This distinction allows one to suppose or claim that the use of unalloyed violence is not solely identified with one kind of violence. Having said this, we can suggest that the "as such," in the second sentence ? "for only mythic violence, not divine, will be recognizable as such" ?
refers to the use of unalloyed violence mentioned in the previous sentence. I therefore suggest that the phrase means, "Only mythic violence, not divine, will be recognizable as unalloyed violence/'
Thus, both mythic violence and divine violence can make use of unalloyed violence, even though they cannot both be recognized as using it and recognized while using it. The use of an unalloyed means towards an end is part of or an effect or expression of expi atory power, something that both kinds of violence possess and which remains invisible to men in the case of divine violence.
Having pointed out this similarity between the mythic and divine ("CV," 252). The revolutionary violence mentioned here, is not only not identical with each of these two forms of violence, mythical and divine, but it is actually placed in opposition to both of them.
Thus, toward the end of his essay, Benjamin makes room for anoth er (and final) opposition, much more sustainable in his writings ?
the opposition between the violence inflicted upon men by power (be it God or God's power) and revolutionary violence, as it is used, for example, by Niobe or Korah, which is a power that chal lenges the existing power and its claim for total and unified sover eignty. Now, if we understand both Niobe and Korah as rebels and read them into Benjamin's last paragraph, we can say that it is less important for humankind to know whether or not either actually used unalloyed means than it is to retrieve their use of revolution ary violence from out of an oblivion, as a violence that testifies to the permanent presence of such revolutionary violence outside the totality and self-preservation of the one law. Thus Niobe and Korah become part of what Benjamin will later call "the tradition of the oppressed"; at the very least they are examples of "the destructive character" that acts within the second tradition, whose existence and principles I have tried to retrieve out of Benjamin's essays on art and on the destructive character. It is important to note that, on the one hand, works of art are not the only type of object that the tradition transmits, and that, on the other hand, the other tradition, too, transmits works of arts among other objects. 12 One can hardly miss here the affinity between Benjamin's thought and Arendt's con cept of natality. 13
The excerpt is taken from a version of the essay on the work of art that was written 
